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Pierre Duhem’s (1861-1916) lifelong opposition to 19th century atomic theories of matter has been 
traditionally attributed to his conventionalist and/or positivist philosophy of science. Relatively recently, 
this thesis has been challenged from the combination of two quite independent lines of 
historiographical development. The first has to do with the status of the 19th century atomic debates 
and argues that, during Duhem’s lifetime, atomism was not the well-established theory most historians 
have presented it to be. The second is concerned with the nature of Duhem’s philosophy of physics and 
argues that it was not positivist, conventionalist, or instrumentalist, but in fact compatible with belief in 
unobservable atoms and molecules. The conclusion to be derived from the blending of the two 
developments is that Duhem’s opposition to atomism was not due to any obsession with the observable 
realm, but to the precarious state of atomic theories during the beginning of the 20th century. It will be 
the aim of this paper to (a) present the inadequacies of both the traditional and the new interpretation 
of Duhem’s opposition to atomism and (b) provide a new framework for understanding the latter.  
 
The traditional debate concerning the nature of the atomic debates during the end of the 19 th century 
(Fleck 1963, Nyhof 1988, Clark 1976) has become recently even more complicated due to 
historiographical efforts trying to reassess the importance of developments in 19th century chemistry 
for atomism. Scholars have challenged the traditional account that saw the determination of atomic 
weights as the main requirement for 19th century chemical atomism and took its resolution during the 
1860s as strong evidence in favor of the atomic hypothesis.  
Ursula Klein, for example, has made the case that the development and use of developed chemical 
formulae portraying chemical properties of compounds were independent from and did not necessarily 
entail a commitment to atomism (Klein 2003). Alan Chalmers has also argued recently that 
“developments in 19th century chemistry paved the way, rather than constituted a case, for an 
experimentally based and testable version of atomism” (Chalmers 2009, p.188). Paul Needham has gone 
one step further claiming that, during the course of the nineteenth century, Daltonian atomism was 
mostly an ad-hoc, non-explanatory theory that lacked any empirical evidence in its favor besides the 
phenomena it was purported to explain. According to Needham, the phenomena of isomerism and the 
notion of valency, were not predictions of the atomic hypothesis, but discovered and developed 
empirically. Moreover, they could be explained and endorsed at the time without any commitment to 
atomism (Needham 2004).  
 
Needham points to the fact that this assessment of 19th century chemical atomism is not very different 
from the one Pierre Duhem had made in two essays published in 1892 and 1902 respectively (Duhem 
2000, 2002, Needham 1996, 2008). For Needham, Duhem’s opposition to atomism was due to 
difficulties with atomism and based on scientific argumentation. Although not directly concerned with 
his arguments against chemical atomism, other Duhem scholars also argue that, contrary the traditional 
portrayal of Duhem as a conventionalist and instrumentalist, his philosophy of physics was in fact 
compatible with belief in unobservable atoms and molecules (Maiocchi 1985, 1990, Lugg 1990). At the 
heart of this reinterpretation of Duhem’s philosophy lies his concept of ‘natural classification’ 
(classification naturelle). It is true, argue the proponents of the new interpretation, that Duhem 
repeatedly insisted that physical theories are not an explanation but a classification of experimentally 
established laws, however, he explicitly maintained that the ultimate aim of physical theory is to 
establish a natural classification of these laws. They argue that, according to Duhem, physical theory is 
converging towards a natural classification of experimental laws which, by reflecting the underlying 
metaphysical order, provides us with information regarding the unobservable realities.  
 
For these authors, Duhem’s philosophy of physics was fully compatible with belief in hidden entities and 
his resistance to atoms was not due to any opposition to scientific explanation or obsession with 
observability, but to the fact that, at the time, both physical and chemical atomism did not have any 
explanatory role in physical chemistry. Duhem’s critique of atomic theories was not directed to scientific 
explanation and scientific atomism per se, but against a non-scientific, a priori, metaphysical atomism, 
on the one hand, and the use of atomistic models as heuristic instruments, on the other.  
 
This interpretation of Duhem’s philosophy of physics, however, is not compatible with his attitude vis a 
vis atoms and molecules. The thesis that Duhem opposed atoms on solid scientific grounds holds good 
for his 1892-1902 version of anti-atomism. It runs into insurmountable difficulties, however, when 
applied to Duhem’s attitude towards atomism after 1905, when developments in different areas of 
research were all converging towards the view that the existence of atoms and molecules was not a 
hypothesis but a reality.  
 
No matter the disagreements regarding the status of atomism during the 19th century, (almost) all 
historians agree that the atomic controversy was over by 1913, with nearly all opponents and skeptics 
being swayed by the power of the experimental evidence in favor of atomism. The crucial evidence was 
offered by Jean Perrin (1870-1942) and his experimental work on ‘Brownian movement’ (Perrin 1908). In 
his 1913 seminal book Les Atomes, Perrin described 13 independent methods which were used to 
calculate Avogadro’s number, including his experiments on the vertical distribution, mean displacement, 
and mean rotation of Brownian particles (Perrin 1913). The concordance of results obtained by totally 
different methods was difficult to resist even by lifelong opponents and skeptics of the kinetic theory 
like Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932) and Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), leaving Duhem and Ernst Mach 
(1838- 1916) as the only major figures who opposed atomism until they died, in 1916 (Nye 1972). That 
the atomic debates were over by 1913 is recognized not only by historians, but also by philosophers of 
science, many of them regarding the calculation of Avogadro number by several independent methods 
as the exemplar of what it is to be considered as a confirmation of a scientific theory (Among them, to 
mention only a few, are Nancy Cartwright, Ian Hacking, Deborah Mayo, Clark Glymour, Peter Achinstein, 
Wesley Salmon). The question that arises is: if Duhem was not an anti-realist with respect to 
unobservables, why was he so vehemently opposed until the end to all theories concerning the 
microstructure of matter?  
 
In this paper I offer an explanation of Duhem’s opposition to unobservable entities that, taking into 
account the new historiographical developments, makes also sense of his late anti-atomism. The specific 
claims I make, fall into three major headings. Firstly, paying attention contrary to the revisionist 
interpretation I argue that the origin and development of Duhem’s philosophy of physics clearly show 
that it was not compatible with belief in unobservable entities. Although, for Duhem, physical theory 
was a natural classification of experimental laws that offered an always and more accurate reflection of 
the underlying metaphysical order, the entities classified were abstract mathematical notions and not 
micro-entities. Even in its ideal ending point, natural classification (physical theory) would not make any 
claims about or contain any references to atoms and molecules. Secondly, although I claim that 
although Duhem’s philosophy of physics was not compatible with belief in atoms and molecules, 
contrary to the traditional view, it was neither conventionalist nor instrumentalist. In order to 
understand the nature of his peculiar philosophical outlook, we have to regard his thought as a whole 
and take into account the larger intellectual, cultural and religious context in which it was formed. 
(Martin 1991, Paul 1972, 1976, Maiocchi 1985, Jaki 1984). Thirdly, and most importantly, I provide a 
new framework in which to understand Duhem’s argument against atomism in the later phase of his 
career. I claim that beginning in the late 1890’s and continuing throughout the rest of his life, as the 
evidence for a discontinuousstructure of matter was building up, Duhem appealed more and more to 
history of science in order to support both his ideal of science and his opposition to atomism. According 
to this interpretation, during his late years, historical evidence played for Duhem the same role that 
scientifically based arguments had played in the earlier period. The concept of natural classification, 
although not a realist position, is very important for understanding Duhem’s resistance to atomism, as it 
provides the link between his philosophy with both history of science and the larger intellectual, cultural 
and religious context. 
 
